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I. History 
i. Introduction 
 The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of memes. I will use the 2016 
American Presidential Election to frame the significance of memes and online communication in 
general. A semiotic model will be constructed as well to contextualize the political and social 
effects of memetic communication. I will conclude by connecting the semiotic model of the 
meme with the political theories of Chantal Mouffe and Hannah Arendt to discuss the potential 
for change as the new media form unfolds.  
Due to the very contemporary nature of my study most of the literature that I am 
discussing will be tangentially related. Memetic communication was originally theorized by 
Richard Dawkins as applying the logic of evolution to cultural information. While the name 
stuck I will be focusing more on the online phenomenon which does not share many similarities 
with Dawkins theory.  
Semiotically speaking I draw from Ferdinand Saussure, Mikhail Bakhtin, Valentin 
Voloshinov, Umberto Eco, Roland Barthes, and Charles Sanders Peirce. While all of them are 
important I mainly use Peirce to discuss the semiotics of memes as his writings privileges the 
relationship between the mental concept of the sign and the sign itself. Using the analysis that 
Barthes uses in Mythologies may be tempting, but he is more concerned with the creation of 
meaning outside the dynamic of the sign and the one person observing it. Both thinkers are 
concerned with what observers bring to the table when decoding semiotic structures, but Peirce 
is more interested with the small scale meaning network that is more relevant for how memes 
function. 
 3 
Instead of being a mere exercise on the modern aesthetics of internet culture, 
understanding the meme form can elucidate facts about the nature of modern political dynamics. 
Our political discourse has undergone a level of mediation through technological processes 
heretofore unseen in humanity’s history. Large social media sites like Facebook and Reddit, 
provide users access to the public square without having to see another physical human being. 
Facebook alone saw that its 1.65 billion users average 50 minutes of time on the site per day. 
That amounts to 82.5 billion minutes clocked on Facebook per day in total. Unlike the famous 
squares that have reached international attention, like Tahrir, Tiananmen, and Times (and those 
are just the T’s) the online forum has no physical limitation on how many would-be 
revolutionaries or passive consumers can gather together in one space. While most of the tech 
giants that made the most popular sites in the world were initially satisfied by profiting off their 
users, the 2016 American presidential election shows the influential nature of technological 
public forums. To best understand what happened online leading up to and during the election, 
and why memes as a form of communication are relevant, we must develop a full intersection 
between the new media and politics. 
In my paper I will also assume that internet communication is structurally speaking 
egalitarian relative to traditional media. The internet medium flattens the differences between 
content creators and audience members. In addition, the limited access to physical means of 
media dissemination- the means to reproduce newspapers or broadcast radio waves- is a moot 
point online. Everyone with internet access can add something to the discussion. This leads to a 
lot of hand wringing on behalf of those who previously held a monopoly on the flow of 
information. On the other side of the spectrum are those who herald the internet as an 
uncomplicated democratizing force, which erroneously assumes that the material access to 
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information disseminating technologies is the sole barrier to a fully functioning and unbiased 
press. I intend to highlight how the flattening of the material distinctions between the producer 
and consumer of media content has created a new landscape for political media, one in which 
ideological difference is fostered through a lack of formalized ideological gatekeepers and 
postmodern identity politics usurps the traditional national paradigm. Present at this flux of 
ideological assertions is the meme, the weapon of choice for the modern trenches of online 
political discourse. 
 
ii.  What is a Meme? 
This first section is to be a history of the meme-form and some basics on how they are used- 
especially in connection with online culture and politics.  
  
 
Above is an example of one of the simplest meme forms. The framework entails a static image of 
a duck, accompanied with large white all-caps Impact font. The captions give advice or life-
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hacks, earning the meme framework the name “Actual Advice Mallard.” The image that is 
shown above was the first instance of Actual Advice Mallard shared on Reddit in 2011.1 All 
initial derivations of the meme entailed merely editing the text, so each different complete 
memes of this class shows the duck giving the reader a different suggestion. The combination of 
the name of the framework and the expectations for the edited caption, display how legibility of 
the meme depends on an understanding of the meme network. Although there is no objective link 
between the photo of a duck and a caption giving advice, the frequency of the connection creates 
a larger structure, a socially sanctioned link between the image and the linguistic markers. For 
example, below is a “mash-up” of both Actual Advice Mallard and Bad Advice Mallard.
 
                                                          
1 http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/actual-advice-mallard 
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The meme is akin to the classic riddle, famously depicted in the film The Labyrinth 
where there are two guardians of a passageway in the labyrinth and one always tells the truth and 
the other always lies. In this meme, both ducks assert that the other gives bad advice. As in the 
movie, the version of the riddle depicted in the meme cannot be solved as in the movie and 
requires prior knowledge of both forms of mallard memes. While the intentions of this meme’s 
original creator are unknowable, it functions by drawing attention to the larger meme networks 
of both advice duck memes. Here, any logical reading is predicated of whether the reader has 
knowledge of the meme’s framework. I will hold a more detailed analysis of the framework's 
impact on meme communication in the Semiotics section of this paper, but a rudimentary 
understanding is important here to make the historical and social overview of memes legible. 
The example of the two Advice Mallard Memes shows how the boundaries of a meme 
framework is constructed. Playing with the boundaries of what is considered a member of any 
meme makes the network for that class becomes apparent. For example, the concept of what is 
considered an “Actual Advice Mallard Meme” is in flux as meme play with various aesthetic 
signifiers of the image or its text. Speaking formally, this is the most constricting definition of 
what it takes to be considered a meme. Many images shared on other social media sites behave 
socially and virally like a meme but do not share any of its distinct framing. Moving forward 
when speaking of memes’ historical import, semiotic particularities, or political influence, I will 
maintain that any given meme’s conceptual framework is explicitly at the forefront of its usage 
and dissemination.  
 Considering the meme there are two definitions to account for. The word meme can refer 
to a large framework of ideas, phrases, or aesthetic signifiers for example what we expect when 
we consider Actual Advice Mallard. This frame then takes shape in the form of a single 
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reference which could be the advice Mallard saying a phrase. This single instantiation of a larger 
framework is what most people refer to when they say the word “meme.” Using the word 
“meme” to refer to the particular image or concept as well as the larger framework may cause 
confusion. To best eliminate ambiguity, I will refer to the instantiation as a meme or complete 
meme, and the framework as the meme framework or conceptual network. To be considered a 
meme, an instance must clearly reference network of signifiers that any one specific instance of 
it can opt into. Then variations of the meme’s framework are constructed as complete memes and 
circulated online. Memes are omnipresent online and communicate all sorts of messages in all 
sorts of social circles. My discussion will focus on the history of online communication, a 
discussion of the current political context that has brought the meme success, a semiotic analysis 
of the meme, and finally a political discussion concerned with the implications of the 
“memeification” of political discourse. 
Internet users construct complete meme through the process of altering or adding to the 
meme template. Certain memes are more flexible with regards to what types of content they can 
accept; the online meme encyclopedia Know Your Meme refers to this as a meme’s 
“exploitability.” 
  In addition, I will assert that the meme can only function when the connection between its 
complete forms and its framework are self-evident to those who are literate in meme-usage. 
Memes are only memes when it is clear they are opting into certain signifiers. This may appear 
to depend too much on logical circuitousness. The claim that memes themselves constitute their 
own frameworks by displaying a trend of signifiers that then construct a legible network lacks 
falsifiability. However, since the creation of these connection semiotic structures is arbitrary the 
only way to study them is through their connection; I will therefore treat the between framework 
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and complete memes as self-evident. Since a meme’s status as a meme is contingent on it opting 
into a framework, any ambiguity as to what larger network it references does not derail its 
reading as a meme of a class but rather prevents it from being read as a meme at all. A meme 
becomes a meme, as opposed to an image, if the viewer sees it as a member of a larger 
conceptual network. 
 Memes as a medium are primarily an online phenomenon, so many of the behaviors and 
vocabulary surrounding them are often new terms for those not of the very-online. Instead of 
defining them all in a list here, I will tackle them when necessary as they arise, to make the paper 
legible.  
Memes on the internet are easy to take for granted. Attempts to tie down a definition only 
serves to emphasize their slipperiness. Before I talk about this technically complex method of 
communication, I will let a meme do the talking for me. The lengthy quotation that follows is a 
“copypasta,” a text-based meme that involves copying and pasting an extended verbose passage 
as a non-sequitur often in an unsolicited position. 
 
“You may be onto something here. Memes used to be simple. Relatable. Worth a 
chuckle. Then they evolved. New formats, new tag lines, new content that was 
then turned into a new meme. Then memes became increasingly meta and self 
reflective. They parodied themselves and the users who both made them and 
consumed them. They built off of one another. They grew. They morphed into 
something entirely novel. This progressed to the point where even that wasn't 
enough. They had to become something more than themselves. They became 
surreal. They became deep fried and nuked. Each flavor building off of the last 
and transforming into a nearly intangible, unknown entity. 
Art progressed in a similar fashion. Started off simple, I'm talking cave drawing 
simple. Then some pottery and some small abstract sculptures. Subjects everyone 
could relate to and understand. Then, as technology allowed for the creation of 
cultures and societies, art began to reflect that change and it evolved along with it. 
By the Ancient Greeks and Romans, art had become a more advanced version of 
the Stone and Bronze Age arts. Better drawings, paintings, and the addition of 
mosaics. Sculptures eventually shifted from stylistic expression to naturalistic 
representation. Still accessible to everyone, yet more nuanced and complex. 
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After the fall of Rome art stagnated and didn't change very much for nearly a 
millennium. Early Christian art dominated for the most part, consisting of murals 
and frescos and simple statues. All of which were based on the Ancient styles. 
Romanesque and Gothic art also built upon these precedents. This all changed 
when the Renaissance attacked. 
A cultural explosion changed the art world forever; arguably starting with the 
Italian artist, Giotto. He began using techniques like foreshortening and linear 
perspective so that the material world could be represented as it appeared to us. A 
callback to the naturalistic stylings of the Greeks. Almost like a reference to the 
days of yore. A celebration of how art used to be, but with the explosion of new 
techniques and technologies, the art grew increasingly diverse. New and improved 
frescoes, meticulously crafted sculptures, architectural marvels and the inclusion 
of new materials in these works. Instead of tempera, oil was introduced along with 
new styles of depicting light and shadow through sfumato and chiaroscuro. These 
techniques and stylistic changes, while impressive, were simply an advancement 
of pre established art. The Renaissance paved the way for the explosion and 
diversification of dozens of art movements that followed. 
From prehistoric art to the end of the Renaissance, art was mostly about the same 
subjects and used similar techniques to accomplish the goal of producing a work 
of art. Yes, the technical proficiency exponentially improved but considering the 
centuries in between, few true advancements were made. 
Compare this to memes. They were so simple at first and really were nothing 
more. Then they got better. More technical. More circumstantial. More media to 
create them with. But memes could last years or many months before dying off. 
As time went on, the longevity of a meme shortened. This is paralleled in the art 
world. 
After the Renaissance the Baroque period started. Then the Neo-Classicism, 
Romantic, Realism, and Impressionism movements not long after. Still utilizing 
the same technical process but the reasoning behind the movements changed. No 
longer was it about simply depicting the world around us, it was about prompting 
the viewer to consider new thoughts and ideas. Urging them to look past the 
image and think deeper about meaning and context. Pushing the boundaries of 
what art could be. The Baroque to Impressionism era spanned roughly 300 years. 
Compare that to the thousands of years between archaic art and the Renaissance. 
It was a huge explosion of self expression. Finally, in the mid to late 19th century 
starting with Post-Impressionism, Modern art emerged. This movement focused 
on self-consciousness, self-reference, introspection, existentialism, and even 
nihilism. I'm talking Fauvism, Cubism, Futurism, Dada, Abstract Expressionism, 
and Surrealism to name the most well known. 
These styles changed what art could be. They were no longer about depicting life 
as is, or layering a painting with hidden motifs for only the privileged to 
understand, they were in and of themselves absurd. Abstract shapes, aggressive 
lines and colors, nonsensical dreamscapes. But it didn't stop there. 
Post-modernism. Pushing art to the limit of its potential. Pop art, Conceptual art, 
Minimalism, Fluxus, Installation art, Lowbrow art, Performance art, Digital art, 
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Earth art. These movements are about skepticism, irony, rejecting grand narratives 
and reason and instead embracing the idea that knowledge and truth are the result 
of social, historical, and political discourse and subsequently are a subjective, 
social construct. It's irreverent and self-referential. It's avant-garde pushed to 11. 
But what's next? Post-postmodernism? Metamodernism? Hypermodernity? Who 
knows? Only time will tell. 
This is where memes are headed. They started off slow but have picked up so 
much momentum they're evolving at an exponential pace. They used to hang 
around for a couple years at most. Then it turned to months. Then maybe only one 
month. Suddenly it was a week tops. While some particularly great memes do still 
stick around much like the masterpieces of art in the past, new memes are created 
every day, every few hours. New movements of memes are being created all the 
time. Anti-memes. Dank memes. Abstract memes. Wholesome memes. Surreal 
memes. Deep fried memes. Nuked memes. Even black hole memes, time travel, 
and dimensional memes are now a reality. What's going to happen next? A return 
to the classics? A new format so brilliant it steals all our hearts and then starts a 
whole new movement? I'm excited for the future of memes. 
TL; DR: Memes imitate art, art imitates life. 
And most importantly we must always remember--- I mean me too thanks lol” 
 
  I saw this post for the first time in the early winter of 2017 and it has henceforth become 
a popular memetic comment in response to structurally experimental memes. Despite the 
meme’s dubious art history, the fact that internet communities treat the mutation of memes with 
such gravity shows the degree in which memes have become unmoored from the banal internet 
funnies of the mid-aughts to early-teens.  
   
 
iii. An Introduction to Online Politics 
The political contentions in the real world have made their war online, since many people 
naturally bring their political ideologies with them when they log on. Most alarmingly in the 
modern political landscape is the rise of far-right politics, in the form of the alt-right, Neo-Nazis, 
and white nationalist movements. The intersection between online spaces and far-right politics is 
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a complex one. Angela Nagle compiled a detailed perspective on these online political 
battlegrounds in her 2017 book Kill All Normies; Online Culture Wars From 4Chan and Tumblr 
to Trump and the Alt-Right. Nagle provides a political, philosophical, and historical lens to this 
trend. She characterizes this shift as a “backlash” where the new conservative political bloc was 
a: 
strange vanguard of teenage gamers, pseudonymous swastika-posting anime 
lovers, ironic South Park conservatives, anti-feminist pranksters, nerdish 
harassers and meme-making trolls whose dark humor and love of transgression 
for its own sake made it hard to know what political view were genuinely held 
and what were merely, as they used to say, for the lulz. (Nagle 2).  
 
While Nagle tries to remain objective, she minimizes the possible political ambitions of 
these various groups. Meanwhile, labeling the anti-feminists as “pranksters” and conflating that 
with the myopic brutality they showed in the case of the gamergate controversy begs the 
question to what extent do writers like Nagle consider the real-world implications of online 
activity. Nagle also introduces a very important topic when considering online communication 
and culture: the lulz.  
Whitney Phillips offers up the most exhaustive account of “lulz” in her sociological book 
on trolls: This is Why We Can’t Have Nice Things. Phillips describes the lulz as an online social 
fetish that encourages certain trolling behaviors: 
Within trolling communities, lulz functions both as punishment and as 
reward, sometimes simultaneously. Lulz operates as a nexus of social 
cohesion and social constraint. It does not distinguish between friend and 
foe, and is as much enjoyed by the trolling spectators as by the active 
trolling-agent. This makes the lulz an extremely slippery term, one that 
implies active pursuit, lulz don’t amass themselves, they have to be sought 
out. (Phillips 28) 
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The lulz are a form of derision or schadenfreude, where there is a perverse enjoyment at 
seeing the discomfort of others. An act or gesture can be lulzy to experience this form of 
enjoyment, which is the ultimate motivation and goal for those engaging in trolling behavior. 
However, the most indicative and pithy take down of what is going on online is a tweet 
from twitter user GreytheTick who writes, “I notice the usage of the term Feminazi has dropped 
off considerably now that the anti-feminists have decided that Nazis aren’t that bad.” Here, they 
highlight a trend that has been occurring across the internet in which formerly garden-variety 
misogynists embrace fascist iconography and rhetoric.  
 
While it is likely that this political shift cannot be completely explained through online 
terms the importance of the online should not be downplayed. The meme as the vehicle of online 
discourse has massive explanatory power in determining what signifiers are being flung about in 
the political-ideological battlegrounds of Tumblr, Facebook, and Reddit. Nagle did point to the 
liberal consensus that dominated the political psyche before this backlash took place, but never 
quite developed the truly material criticism of the rise of modern online fascism. For instance, it 
may be easy to place white nationalists and their ideological ilk within the greater potpourri of 
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identity politics. However, as a movement, their platform questions the legitimacy of identity 
politics, although in name only. This is complicated by the irony of how the political apparatus 
of white nationalism relies on the existence of identity politics to push against. While the 
connection between the rise of extreme right-wing politics is not directly connected to memetic 
communication, it serves to contextualize the radicalization that is afforded by eschewing 
mainstream media options, a phenomenon that will be discussed at length later in the paper.  
 
iv. Modern Meme Politics 
The political influence of online communication and memes entered the national and 
global consciousness after the 2016 American political election. Where the online right hailed 
the power of “meme-magic” to explain their victory, the liberal wing rallied against what they 
saw as an army of Russian meme that is an existential threat to American democracy. While I 
will consider the meme forms that are employed by the left, I will primarily focus on the memes 
and communities that gathered around various right-wing causes (either establishment or not). 
My decision to focus more on one side of the political aisle stems from the right-wing memes’ 
effect on the political consciousness. People online are more aware of the right-wing cohorts2 of 
meme-sharers and I hope to elucidate to what degree this activity translated to electoral success.  
Choosing to focus more on the right-wing approach also provides me the opportunity to 
study more closely the most infamous meme during the last election: Pepe the Frog. Pepe as a 
case study for the politicization of memes highlights the connection between online aesthetics, 
the current state of political discourse, and a case-in-point on how a meme-signifier became a 
battleground for the online culture wars. Originated in the comic Boy’s Club by cartoonist Matt 
                                                          
2 http://observer.com/2015/12/15-memes-tumblr-obsessed-over-in-2015/ 
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Furie, the image of the sad anthropomorphic frog was hugely popular in the late aughts on online 
forums such as Gaia online, Myspace, and 4chan. By 2015, the image was officially tumblr’s 
“most reblogged meme” and was still pivotal on 4chan. The normal meme distribution of free 
sharing was complicated by a now infamous 4chan post that featured edited Pepe images that 
were characterized as “Rare Pepes”. Some of these came with added “seals of authenticity” in 
order to legitimize their value. This caused an explosion of “Pepe trading” where files containing 
up to several thousand discrete Pepe images were traded. The craze reached the mainstream to 
such a degree that celebrities such as Katy Perry and Nicki Minaj were sharing their own Rare 
Pepes.3 4chan took the mainstream success of Pepe memes and the Rare Pepe shtick as a 
personal attack and an instance of their culture being appropriated. They were furious at what 
they viewed as normal people using the meme. 4chan characterizes the folks who do not spend a 
lot of time online with the derogatory label of “normie.” In response, the trollish wing of 4chan 
purposefully constructed Pepes that were intended to be as inflammatory, offensive, or 
distasteful as possible. Pepes with Hitler moustaches or Ku Klux Klan robes were abundant, all 
with hopes to make Pepe lose its mainstream appeal. While the trolls wished to “reclaim Pepe as 
their own,” the political campaign of Donald Trump was beginning to reach full swing. In a 
convenient move to appeal to his very-online demographic, or perhaps to flex his anti-
establishment muscles, Trump tweeted in October of 2015 a Trump Pepe alongside the caption 
“You Can’t Stump the Trump.” 
                                                          
3 https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/vvbjbx/4chans-frog-meme-went-mainstream-so-they-tried-to-kill-it 
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  Trump’s tweet served as vindication for liberals that Pepe was now an official symbol for 
Trump and the alt-right, while it simultaneously was an acknowledgment for the online young 
reactionaries that Pepe was now a Trump-sanctioned symbol to rally around. The desire to make 
Pepe more unattractive for the “normies” and the lulzy political engagement for the grassroots 
elements of Trump’s campaign created a perfect storm for flooding forums with Pepes with 
various ideological trappings from across the spectrum of reactionary politics. This activity 
culminated on September 27, 2016 when the Anti-Defamation League stated that Pepe was now 
officially classified as a hate symbol, while conceding that not all Pepes have such malicious 
intentions. The reactions on the 4chan boards have been one of bored nihilism who viewed their 
effortful campaign as nothing more than a whimsical skirmish.4 Opposing this shift is Matt Furie, 
the original creator of the Pepe character was saddened by the manipulation of Pepe to be used 
                                                          
4 https://yuki.la/r9k/31711843 
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for such harmful intentions and has started an online movement of his own, #savethepepe, in an 
attempt to “reclaim” Pepe from its unwholesome associations. This caused outrage on right-wing 
forums, especially the subreddit on Reddit called /r/The_Donald, whose members treat Pepe with 
the same reverence that is usually only reserved for Trump himself. Many posts called Matt 
Furie a cuck while sharing edited Pepes showcasing their crude disapproval.5 
The usage of Pepe for this paper is multi-leveled. Pepe behaves in the classic meme 
fashion semiotically speaking. A true semiotic analysis will take place in the next section as well 
as determining to what degree the Pepe meme is an exemplar of classic memetic semiotic 
structures or not. In addition, Pepe is very historically and politically rich. The purposeful 
manipulation of the signification of Pepe asks to what degree the connection between the sad 
frog and its most hateful intentions or usages are arbitrary. In a sense, the study will be 
determining the legitimacy of those who claim Pepe to be a hateful flagbearer for the American 
reactionary right or a simple cartoon frog where any hateful interpretations are purely 
coincidental. 
I do not want to characterize the meme form as inherently reactionary, fascist, or even 
conservative, as that would be equating politics to a structural semiotic system. However, after 
the election of Donald Trump many middle-brow liberal publications were trying to determine 
how Hillary Clinton could have lost such a winnable election. This lead to some famous online 
meme-users to be caught in the political crossfire. One example of this is when Fader, an online 
media journal, published an alarmist article criticizing Anthony Fantano, a successful YouTube-
based music reviewer, for what they viewed to be racist meme-usage. The article stated that 
Fantano had a side channel that “pandered to the alt-right.”6 The Needle Drop (the main 
                                                          
5 https://np.reddit.com/r/The_Donald/comments/70xxx8/matt_furie_is_a_cuck_you_cant_kill_pepe/ 
6 http://www.thefader.com/2017/10/03/needle-drop-deleted-youtube-channel-this-is-the-plan 
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YouTube channel that Fantano posts most of his reviews on) has over a million subscribers and 
Fantano keeps most of his music reviews relatively apolitical. His side channel, thatistheplan, 
had around 400,000 subscribers prior to its deletion in response to the Fader article. Instead of 
earnest music reviews, thatistheplan’s most common videos were filled with bizarrely edited 
videos filled with memes and filled to the brim with various online aesthetic signifiers. The 
Fader article references several evocatively titled videos of the former channel namely “I 
CHANGED MY GENDER BECAUSE OF DONALD TRUMP” and “pepe the frog triggers 
hillary clinton,” as examples of what they believe to be Fantano opting into meme culture and 
therefore alt-right politics. Unfortunately, the article failed to delve into the actual political 
content of the videos in which opting into internet aesthetics rejects the holier than thou 
liberalism in order to appeal to the online audience. While Fantano was using signifiers often 
associated with far-right online culture, such as air horns and Pepe, they were being used to laud 
Obama and Bernie or to support single-payer healthcare. Critics after the fact said that Fantano 
should have realized that the aesthetic similarities between him and the alt-right could have made 
him seem guilty by association, but all it took was a scroll through his Twitter profile to make 
Fantano’s true political positions clear. The music critic asserted in his response video that “there 
is nothing inherently right-wing about memes7” but, nevertheless, Fantano’s meme-heavy video 
channel has been deleted and several of his speaking tours have been cancelled. While Fantano 
was correct to say that memes are not inherently right-wing, they are often lumped in with a 
transgressive online aesthetic that is deemed asocial. The association between various online 
aesthetic signifiers is not objective and is rather a reaction to the electoral defeat of Hillary 
Clinton. This reaction characterizes the meme as potentially right-wing, but only to the extent 
                                                          
7 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2UZqIIy7pAk 
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that people believe this association to be true. I will characterize the meme as equal opportunity 
with respects to its ideological inflections.  
The only inherent politics that are available to the meme form is that of anti-
authoritarianism and a visceral disdain with established mainstream media outlets. Nagle 
characterizes the death of old news media institutions as a case of obsolescence and not a 
purposeful rejection against the old guard: 
 
The bursting forth of irreverent mainstream-baffling meme culture during the last 
race, in which the Bernie Sanders Dank Meme Stash Facebook page and 
The_Donald subreddit defined the tone of the race for a young and newly 
politicized generation, with the mainstream media desperately trying to catch up 
with a subcultural in-joke style to suit to emergent anti-establishment waves of the 
right and left. Writers like Manuel Castells and numerous commentators in the 
Wired magazine milieu told us of the coming of a networked society, in which old 
hierarchical models of business and culture would be replaced by the wisdom of 
crowds, the swarm, the hive mind, citizen journalism and user-generated content. 
They got their wish, but it’s not quite the utopian vision they were hoping for. As 
old media dies, gatekeepers of utopian sensibilities and etiquette have been 
overthrown, notions of popular taste maintained by a small creative class are now 
perpetually outpaced by viral online content from obscure sources, and culture 
industry consumers have been replaced by constantly online, instant content 
producers. The year 2016 may be remembered as the year the mainstream media’s 
hold over formal politics died. A thousand Trump Pepe memes bloomed and a 
strongman larger-than-life Twitter troll who showed open hostility to the 
mainstream media and to both party establishments took The White House 
without them. (Nagle 3) 
 
Nagle correctly characterizes the plane of the Trump Pepes and Bernie Sander Dank 
Meme pages on Facebook as the modern political media landscape. This new political media is a 
network as opposed to top-down and the lines between performer, spectator, and audience 
member are thoroughly blurred. Even though there is only anti-authoritarianism that is encoded 
in the structures of the online communities, memetic communication, and humor, both sides of 
the online political aisle attempt to claim the meme as their own. The Left asserts that the meme 
is inherently communist due to its free cost, while the Right make an equally absurd claim that 
 19 
“the Left can’t meme.”8  The ideological backing here is that the humorless attitude of 
establishment liberalism prevents the creation and distribution of any high-quality meme-
making.  
 
 
“Meme Marx,” found on KnowYourMeme original date and poster unknown 
 
v. The Fake News Specter 
 
Finally, it would be a grave error to ignore the overall political anxiety felt across the 
American (and perhaps global) online communities which have been exacerbated by the Russian 
hacking scandal and the specter of fake news. The heavily politicized usage of the term ‘fake 
news’ was used by the right to smear mainstream journalism outlets, while the liberal center was 
concerned with what they saw as rampant fallaciously constructed news stories. In order to 
determine the boundaries between the political memes that are the focus of this paper and all 
                                                          
8 http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/the-left-cant-meme 
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political content disseminated online, a brief diversion describing the different types of 
misinformation and political “spin” often used online will follow. 
The politics of the phrase “Fake News” has become a clichéd expression to discredit 
journalism that does not follow one’s own ideological persuasions. In addition, the severe 
centrist response to the moral failing of the perceived threat of fake news is a reaction stoked by 
the anxieties of mainstream journalism outlets, who fear their dying influence over American 
political thought. Fake news is not explicitly a creation of the internet; fake news has been 
around since the time of the Roman Empire to discredit Mark Antony and was also used to 
spread blood libel against medieval Jewish folk. However, accusing the internet of spreading 
fake-news is particularly evocative when considering its lack of formalized gatekeepers. To what 
degree the “fake-news” story spread due to its own merits, or if it was purposefully stoked by the 
fears of the previous gatekeepers of print and cable media institutions is still up for debate. 
Zeynep Tufekci, a Turkish intellectual and journalist, is oft-heralded as the “fake-news” expert 
and has held multiple Ted talks on the subject. Her book, Twitter and Tear Gas, provides 
practical examples of fake news manipulation in both American elections and populist media 
platforms covering the Arab Spring. In her book, Tufekci characterizes two different types of 
purposefully constructed media manipulation, although she never formally distinguishes between 
the two, they are different enough in content and operation to warrant a classification. In her 
description of the Arab Spring, Tufekci lauds citizen run media operations in which protesters 
can crowdsource journalism online, hopefully to warn their fellow protestors of either 
particularly entrenched police positions or to inform them of areas of relative safety. Tufekci 
then characterized the notable shift on the efficacy of this networked journalism during the 2016 
Turkish coup d'état attempt (whether it was an actual coup or not is not of issue here), where the 
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websites and groups that were originally remarkably effective at informing protestors, became 
flooded with misinformation and the site’s organizers were unable to verify or discredit the 
information quickly enough. Tufekci highlights their potential power and eludes to their ability 
to manipulation as follows: 
Nawaat activists did much of their curating and monitoring from abroad, a 
practice that seems antithetical to understanding the dynamics of a movement. 
However, when social media curating is done correctly, it can be far more 
conducive to a comprehensive reporting effort than being in one place on the 
ground, amid the confusion, as traditional journalists tend to be. A traditional 
journalist can see what is in front of her nose and hear what she is told; a social 
media journalism curator can see hundreds of feeds that show an event from many 
points of view.  Tufekci 41-42. 
 
 This form of deliberate misleading, akin to “astroturfing” (a term usually associated with 
online marketing), is characterized by the purposeful masking of institutional communications 
with the guise of populist or citizen level involvement. In the case of the Arab Spring and 
beyond, the implications of this form of astroturfing was a matter of life or death. Astroturfing is 
distinguishable from the other form of purposeful distortion, as in this case its power comes from 
the illusion of coming from fellow citizens or bottom-up.  
 However, the other form of “fake news” is a much more salient factor upon the American 
political consciousness. Mainstream news publications such as MSNBC covered stories of 
teenagers in Macedonia9 or other nations who are paid to deliberately fabricate news stories 
online under the guise of legitimate online journalism. They often went to such lengths as 
engineering website headers purporting affiliation with media outlets that do not exist. “The 
internet made it easy for anyone to quickly set up a webpage, and Facebook’s user interface 
made it hard to tell the legitimate news outlets such as the New York Times or Fox News apart 
                                                          
9 http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-38168281 
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from fake ones such as the ‘Denver Guardian’” (Tufekci 298). Here the power to deceive is 
enabled by the illusion that the media text is coming from a place of power or authority.  
 When considering political or memetic communication online its power to persuade 
comes from its perceived earnest intentions when compared with the stuffy political intentions of 
classic media institutions. The power of the internet to communicate from peer to peer changed 
the media paradigm permanently. As Marcel Danesi stated in his book on The Semiotic of Emoji,  
 
It is obvious that writing does indeed seem to encourage literate people to see 
themselves as separate individuals and develop a unique sense of Self. Prior to the 
spread of writing, knowledge was the privilege of the few and literacy was left in 
the hands of those in power. The growth of literacy substantially reduced the 
power of those in authority as written texts could be read “individually” and 
interpretations of their content reached subjectively (Danesi 172). 
 
Just as literacy spread and people did not need to depend upon the clergy to interpret 
religious texts, now as a different media landscape is constructed there is less dependence on the 
traditional media goliaths. 
 From this point, having established what is at stake when discussing the meme and online 
communication, I am going to move forward onto a more specialized semiotic analysis of what 
makes a meme. From the semiotic theory a connection to their distinct political ramifications 
will come clear. 
 
II. Semiotics 
 
i. Memes are not Language 
 
 A semiotic analysis describing the function of the meme as a communication system will 
start by comparing them with other relevant sign-systems, namely natural human language and 
emojis. Highlighting the differences between memes and other communication forms provides a 
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frame of reference with other sign-systems and it also accentuates their historical import as a 
truly different style of communication, rather than just writing them off as nothing more than a 
picture that is shared online. I will also talk more in detail about any portions of their semiotic 
framework that may be relevant in the discussion of their political potential.  
 Semiotics started with a linguist, and the relationship between linguistics and semiotics 
has always been a close one. Saussure, the progenitor of modern semiotics, used spoken human 
language as the sign-system to define the terms that are now omnipresent in semiotics; namely 
sign, signifier, and signified. While the goal of semiotics to adequately theorize the intricacies of 
the linguistic sign may be semiotics ultimate raison d'etre, a complete history of this pursuit is 
not the intention of this paper. Although natural human language is often considered the sign 
system par excellence, language is unique when it is compared with other sign systems. While it 
is true that memes often have a written language component, it does not provide any significant 
connection to the semiotic structures of spoken language. Not only does basically all linguistic 
study focus on spoken language, it views written language as a different semiotic system with its 
own rules and meaning-making processes.  
Saussurean structuralism was motivated by linguistic study- but other than the formal 
similarities of the terminology where the sign is the vehicle for communication, any other 
perceived commonalities between language and memes begin to break down. The uniqueness of 
human language is not a new assertion and many linguists have created theories or benchmarks 
proving how either animal communication systems or other human sign systems fail to measure 
up to the complexity of natural language. Most compellingly, is Hockett’s design features of 
language, where he highlighted that all human languages (regardless of any superficial 
appearances of complexity) possess the same 16 “design features” or traits and that no other 
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communication system that we have encountered has matched any human language in this 
regard. Although primate communication has been noted to have 9 of the design features they 
lack more complex distinctions such as displacement or reflexiveness. Primates do not have the 
ability to talk about things or concepts that are not physically present, nor can they use language 
to talk about language. This prevents any animal communication system from matching the 
complexity of human language. Comparing human language to memetic communication using 
Hockett’s design features is very limited in its application. I am not making the claim that memes 
are a “new language” and nor do I want to create a paradigm in which memes are a 
communication system that does not “measure up” to language. Therefore, another way of 
semiotically describing language is necessary to draw an adequate comparison between the two 
without the meme immediately becoming just an aberration of language rather than its own 
autonomous system.  
Although it may be compelling to refer to the online meme-sharing youth as “meme 
literate” that does not serve as an indictment to the language qualities of meme-usage. While 
meme communication does have its own set of rules, expectations, and sociological norms to 
facilitate their usage, it is incorrect to call them a language. Through the combination of both the 
visual element and the linguistic ones- meaning is created. The language that is used in memes is 
often restricted by its framework to certain types of phrases, for example think of the short 
snippets of advice used for the Mallard Memes. Language usage within the meme framework is 
as regulated by the framework as the meme’s visual elements. This is significant as it allows the 
analysis of the language used in memes to be contextualized by the meme’s framework on a case 
by case basis, it is nothing more than a part of the framework as opposed to something outside of 
the larger semiotic structure  
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ii. Auto-Semiosis 
 Moving out of Suassure’s linguistic structuralist approach there was a rich tradition of 
linguistic inquiry that rose up after him. Linguists and thinkers such as Valentin Voloshinov and 
Mikhail Bakhtin picked up where Saussure left off, expanding upon his coldly structuralist 
semiotic analysis. Out of this relatively disparate set of thinkers arose an idea that language was 
the only semiotic system that had the ability to undergo “auto-semiosis,” that signs within a 
language use themselves and others to create other signs. This observation also showcases how 
language is privileged with respects to all other mental processes in humans. I am not attempting 
to write a paper analyzing memes through emoji or bricolage, but rather via language. Although 
memes are not an inherent communication system that has innate structures within the human 
brain, the way in which they relate to one another is like the auto-semiosis capabilities of natural 
language.  
 To highlight this similarity, I will use two memes, the Persuadable Bouncer10 and 
Drakeposting11 memes, both are considered to be “exploitable 4-panel comics.” The structures 
within them are similar, in which the form shows either the rapper Drake or the eponymous 
Bouncer expressing disapproval about the first image displayed in either comic. Then in the next 
pair of images there is a different image which is supposed to be superior (in either an earnest or 
ironic sense) that warrants Drake to show his approval or for the Bouncer to let “it in the club.” 
Some examples are below: 
 
                                                          
10 http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/persuadable-bouncer 
11 http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/drakeposting 
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Fig: “Persuadable Bouncer” from Know Your Meme, collected on March 14, 2018, original poster unknown. 
 
 
Fig: “Drakeposting” from Know Your Meme, collected March 14, 2018, original poster Martín Palma 
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 Formally speaking, the memes display very similar semiotic structures, as they are claiming that 
one thing, concept, or image is superior to another. At this point, the relationship between the 
framework and added content again shows its importance. Compared to other communication 
forms they are uncommonly aware of their structures and framing on how they communicate. 
Both the information that is added to the template is important, but also the template in and of 
itself. There are many memes that display an “A is better than B” relation, including “Distracted 
Boyfriend12” or “Left Exit 12 Off Ramp.13” In this case, the thing that is better is either a person 
that is making your head turn or a ramp that requires one to rapidly swerve to take the exit. There 
are slight nuances that make each of the different meme templates slightly distinct, but in the end 
their structures are quite similar. Meme creation mandates a knowledge of the templates and this 
creates “crossovers” or mutations of templates.  
 
 
                                                          
12 http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/distracted-boyfriend 
13 http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/left-exit-12-off-ramp 
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Fig: Drakeposting/Exit 12/Distracted Boyfriend Crossover from Know Your Meme poster 
NekothePony 
 
 Here this meme highlights the similarities between the various templates as Drake, the 
car, and the distracted boyfriend are all showcasing their approval/disapproval through the 
various elements within the others’ templates. This mashup of meme template and concepts 
shows how the meme creators are explicitly aware of the boundaries of any specific meme class. 
Memetic communication encourages this type of knowledge where an exhaustive understanding 
of the network is needed to make legible memes. The above meme can be viewed as a sort of 
memetic “pun.” Just like how language users use similar linguistic units to draw attention to the 
similarities and double meanings of words for comedic purposes, this shows that meme-users 
often think in similar ways. This sort of usage also muddies the interpretation that memetic 
communication is a simple formulaic process but instead characterizes it in a more generative 
and creative fashion. While this is not nearly as productive of a process as the auto-semiosis that 
is possible through natural language, the ability to play with the templates is a semiotic feature 
that is pivotal to the power of the meme.  
 
iii. Distancing Memes from Other Digital Communication Forms 
 Next, I will distance the meme structures away from another pictographic online 
communication system: Emoji. The book on the subject, Marcel Danesi’s The Semiotics of Emoji 
takes a decidedly linguistic and semiotic approach to analyzing this sign system. Danesi 
purposefully distances himself from calling Emoji usage a language and instead calls it “the 
Emoji code.” One of the overarching claims made in the book is that Emoji is used to alter the 
 29 
register of the text-based speech into something that is not meant to be taken too seriously. 
Danesi does not want to equate this lack of seriousness with a lack of complexity even when he 
states that, “perhaps the emoji code is just another fad… tapping into a comic book or cartoonish 
mind-set that is characteristic of pop-culture style in all domains of human interaction” (Danesi 
158). Yet he goes on to qualify the previous statement by admitting that the flexibility of emoji is 
indicative of “an ever-broadening hybridity of representation that comes from living in the 
digital age” (Danesi 158). Although how emojis and memes are discredited as foolish online 
kitsch underplays their ability to communicate online messages in a global setting. “Epigenetic 
global code” is how Danesi describes online communication; one in which those who are using it 
have a significant say in its rules and application.  
 Formally speaking, the meme and the emoji are distinct. The main difference between the 
two systems is that memes are generative while emojis are not. Emojis create meaning by 
reorganizing and ordering themselves in specific ways within a closed class of specific images in 
a specific medium. “The act of emoji creation” involves adding certain pre-created images to a 
text message. There is no opportunity to edit the emojis as they come pre-programmed onto most 
cellular devices. Memes do not follow this same logic. The two-fold parts of memes, the 
framework and the complete meme, is evidence of their more mutable nature. Meme-making 
involves making a new image through editing a preconstructed one. Both communication forms 
take advantage of digital technologies ability to reproduce images rapidly; but the meme uses the 
computer’s ability to edit content. This difference between the two helps elucidate that although 
memetic communication happens online, not all digital communication is memetic. 
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 Now that a significant distinction has been made separating online internet memes with 
natural language and emoji, I will describe its own semiotic features by discussing the semiotic 
peculiarities of memes specifically.  
 
iv. Studying Pepe using the Semiotics of Pierce 
 When considering memes there are few that stand out more than Pepe the Frog. As 
previously stated the politicization of Pepe has reached a high level, with people treating the 
once innocent frog as a contemptuous hate symbol or the flagbearer of their entire political 
ideology. Starting out to formalize how Pepe communicates, one must first consider how a 
concept of a meme is larger than any one instantiation. There are countless Pepe images online, 
that have been edited, photoshopped, have added text, or undergone any other alteration 
processes. As discussed earlier I will consider that a meme’s membership of any larger network 
as clearly defined and self-evident for any one specific meme.  
The salience of the meme’s overarching template encourages an analysis outside of the 
simple sign/signifier/signified relationship of Saussure’s structuralism. The semiotic theory of 
Charles Sanders Pierce is the most compelling analysis in describing the relationship between a 
meme’s class membership and any one specific meme. Peirce in the collection Peirce on Signs 
complicates the simplicity of the construction of a whole sign from its constitutive parts. He does 
this by claiming that a mental concept of the sign intrudes upon the semiosis. “Since a sign is not 
identical with the thing signified, but differs from the latter in some respects, it must plainly have 
some characters which belong to it in itself” (Peirce 68). While memes are almost always digital 
and do not have the natural link that Peirce speaks of, ‘the thing signified’ that Peirce references 
could be the mere allusion to the overarching meme class that the meme has membership of. 
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Strictly speaking, Pepe memes only maintain their Pepe status by their likeness. There is no 
explicit link connecting any one Pepe meme to the larger Pepe class of memes. In other words, it 
is not natural for any image to be associated with Pepe but rather it must purposefully opt into 
the Pepe likeness. This act of disruption between the individual instantiations and the meme 
framework allows the meme to be more complex than the sum of its parts.  
To break this down even further, the act of meme-creation involves adding to or altering 
the framework of the meme. When considering the meme’s framework as something that can be 
altered, start by thinking of an exemplar of any meme framework, which in the case of Pepe 
would be an image of Pepe without any added elements, or for a meme like Actual Advice 
Mallard would be just the picture of the duck without text. Then as someone alters the 
framework to make a complete meme it is that content used in the alteration process that carries 
the brunt of the communicative content. When you see a new Actual Advice Mallard meme the 
information that is most noticeable is the added text or any aesthetic shifts that occurred, as it is 
where the meme is different from its exemplar. This way of thinking where we notice what 
violates our expectations is not limited to just thinking about memes.  
For example, I use a computer that is not an Apple product. Although no one would say 
my computer is not a computer it still violates the expectation that a computer used by a college 
student is likely to be a Mac. When someone sees my computer, a decidedly not-stylish Lenovo 
Thinkpad, it is still enough of a computer to be seen as one, yet its non-Apple traits are 
exceptionally noticeable.  
Focusing on the information that was added to the framework also makes the ideological 
claiming of a meme easy. There are countless memes that are often used for political purposes: 
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either Strawman Ball,14 Daily Struggle,15 or Hard to Swallow Pills16, just to name a few. Being 
too numerous to dissect each of them individually, they are often used in political communities 
to attacks or point out the contradictions of the other side of the aisle. The point here being that 
there is not a meme that only liberals use to attack leftists and vice versa. Memes are equal 
opportunity when considering their ability to make ideological assertions.  
`  
Pepe the frog: taken from Know Your Meme, March 16, 2018, original poster unknown. 
 
 Returning to Peirce, who is mostly interested in the semiotic structures of language, he 
believes that breaking down natural language elements into its constitutive parts will eventually 
reach a dead end, “every thought, however artificial and complex, is, so far as it is immediately 
present, a mere sensation without parts, and therefore, in itself, without similarity to any other, 
                                                          
14 http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/picardia 
15 http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/daily-struggle 
16 http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/hard-to-swallow-pills 
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but incomparable with any other and absolutely sui generis [unique] (Peirce 70).” Language to 
Peirce is not made up of other signs but rather it is natural law, “every thought, in so far as it is a 
feeling of a peculiar sort, is simply an ultimate, inexplicable fact” (Peirce 70). Memes of course, 
cannot claim to have such lofty origins and often bubble out of the painfully arbitrary; such as a 
webcomic for Pepe, or a prematurely dead gorilla in the case of a meme like Harambe. Peirce 
never claims that any one individual can change the link between language and the natural world, 
which also contrasts with the more mutable, epigenetic qualities of digital communication.   
 The elevation of the larger framework of the meme complicates the case of Pepe and how 
people should treat the famous frog. There are assuredly countless instances of Pepe memes that 
are either apolitical or even progressive in their stance, but to what degree they are outliers of the 
public perception of Pepe, remains to be seen. In the case of Pepe, that gives the viewer two 
options: see the images of Pepe as a meme only to the extent that they know it is a meme or 
approach the image with the knowledge that the Pepe class of memes has purposefully 
constructed connotations of racism and fascism. To what degree the Pepe-sharers were 
legitimately using the frog to disseminate Nazi ideology or racist fearmongering is still a 
question, as the manipulation of how the public perceived Pepe to take it back from the normies 
was the goal in its own right. I do not have anything in the case of prescriptive rules for judging 
the soul of Pepe, nor do I have any attentions to exonerate or indict the meme, as either 
redeemable or at the same tier as a swastika.  
Concluding my take on the Pepe meme in particular- the slipperiness of the meme’s true 
intentions seems to be a feature and not a bug. Alt-right members gathering at protests wear their 
Pepe affiliations on their sleeves, whose goofy online aesthetics affords a certain far-right 
politics that is given plausible deniability via its arbitrariness. There has not yet been any mass 
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killing perpetrated by followers under a Pepe-flag, but gathering at demonstrations and shouting 
“normies out” makes one wonder who is considered a normie17 and to what extent their political 
engagement is beyond the lulz. Using Pepe, or memes in general can be used by anyone from 
any political ideology and can be used to try and enact all sorts of political goals. This lack of a 
connection to actual political seats of power affords memetic communication to speak truth to 
power without putting anything on the line. While there is a decidedly Trumpian wing of online 
meme sharing, the sort who were described in Philip’s account treat all politics as a big joke. 
Meme’s ability to create a sense of identity around a shared online literacy reflects back to my 
statements on the anti-authoritarian internet, which has an endlessly cynical view of power.   
Some may claim that the liberal or progressive Pepe’s can serve as proof that the meme is 
neutral and is solely what one makes of it. However, it is through the relationship between 
memes and their framework that the restrictions and unspoken expectations come forth. When 
Matt Furie, the original author/creator of Pepe makes an image of the frog wearing a “Make Pepe 
Great Again” hat and urinating on a Trumpian incarnation of the frog, it serves to admit the 
corruption of the meme-framework. Additional Pepe memes have been circulating trying to 
distance the meme’s network from the alt-right associations.  
                                                          
17 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/23/alt-right-online-humor-as-a-weapon-facism 
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Fig. “Make Pepe Great Again” by Matt Furie. Source: The Atlantic. 
 
 
Fig: Make Pepe Great Again found on twitter from Rainbow Jedi, original creator/poster unknown. 
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 As the perceived meme-framework and understanding of Pepe is that of a far-right icon, 
all memes of Pepe carry that association with them. While there may be memes pushing back 
against that association, the public at large considers him unwholesome, and hate symbols only 
become hate symbols through some concept of consensus. This may seem like a contradiction to 
what was stated earlier in the case of meme’s structurally being equal opportunity, but that is not 
the case. A meme can have any added content to it that attacks or supports any political ideology 
and their flexibility supports this. When considering Pepe as a framework that has associations of 
far-right politics it does not remove the possibility of progressive Pepes, as the link between 
hatred and the Pepe meme is arbitrary. All non-fascist Pepes are in act of resistance from the 
framework and are still completely legible.  
This is unfortunately as concrete of an analysis as possible when it comes to Pepe. This 
did not feel very satisfying for me after seeing so many Pepes that were among the most racist 
and bigoted images I have seen online. Unfortunately, it was the only interpretation that was 
honest and that acknowledged the larger political landscape. It is also probable that the racist 
Pepes are especially incensing as they juxtapose bigotry with an innocent and even silly original 
image. While the swastika provides a historical footing to understand and name the hatred, a 
Hitler Pepe treats the slaughter of innocents as a joke. The irreverent treatment of the Holocaust 
at the hands of a cartoon frog is much more palatable to mainstream people as it can be written 
off as the action of lunatic online trolls. Unfortunately, any legitimate criticisms levied against 
racist are often deflected by “it’s just a joke.” 
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Hitler Pepe, from 4Chan, original poster and date unknown. 
 
v. A Semiotic Model of Memes 
To synthesize these relatively disparate parts- the comparison with language, Pepe, and 
the semiotics of Peirce into a cogent theory, one element loomed over the rest with respects to 
relevance. The meme is a communication form in which its network and any instantiations are 
held in equal import, and it is only through their confluence is a legible meme created. In 
language, the listener brings their language skills and sociocultural information to be able to 
decode the information of the speaker. Similarly, in memes, the observer brings their 
understanding of the memetic network which elevate the image or concept to “memehood.” This 
creates a dynamic in which successfully creating a meme requires an understanding of the 
framework. Altering images into a meme template does not always make legible variations 
without an adequate understanding of their template. In the conclusion, I will talk about the 
political implications of this fact and how the higher barrier of entry for memetic communication 
alters the political landscape around in-group/out-group dynamics and performed authenticity.  
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III. Politics 
i. Past Understandings of Online Media and Politics 
 The impact of media and media institutions on the global political landscape has always 
been of importance. Freedom of the press is one of the founding tenets of all modern democratic 
states. Classic understanding of reactionary or despotic regimes are often characterized as having 
a nigh perfect track record of attacking media institutions through the labels of “fake news” or 
the classic “lügenpresse.“ Criticisms levied against the press and media (whether legitimate or 
not) are often predicated upon a separation between government power, the citizens, and the 
media institutions. Institutional power based within the state attempt to construct accusations 
brought forth by the media or press groupings as unfounded- that they are a corrupting force 
upon the consciousness of the people. For example, Hitler attacking media institutions is only 
coherent on the predication that not all of the German citizens were active in constructing the 
media narrative. As news media decentralization and digitization occurs, a reading of news 
media institutions as a unified body that the state needs to grapple with is outdated. How political 
entities negotiate this new territory of citizen-run media is the focus of this section as well as 
how internet memes function on the intersection between online political communication and 
seats of legitimate electoral power.  
 The past paradigm of the relationship between media and government has been of two 
large distinct institutions engaged in a quarrel of begrudging necessity. Books written before the 
2016 presidential election, such as R.J. Maratea’s Politics of the Internet or the essay collection 
Culture and Politics of the Information Age, consider the internet as a vehicle to view and share 
institutional media communications. The internet’s ability to decentralize media narratives away 
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from a few ideological gatekeepers is often understated by the claim that the sole communicative 
act that people consider is the sharing and commenting of articles from corporate media sources. 
Maratea however lauds this process and labels it as “meta-journalism” where “commenting and 
reinterpreting of new stories online” (Maratea 35) supplies an additional chunk of media 
information in the overarching online journalism process. Maratea is right to say that meta-
journalism is a radical shift when comparing it to more traditional top-down and centralized 
media paradigms, such as print journalism or radio broadcast. However, it is still an inadequate 
representation of the modern media landscape that takes place online. Looking beyond mere 
meta-journalism one must consider how internet communication is radically different from other 
media forms to allow for a new context of political communication.  
  
ii. “Post”-politics 
 Many scholars assert that as countries transition to a post-industrial economic mode and 
contort to the modern international media landscape, many classically accepted forms of social 
relations begin to wither away. This anxiety was present in Frank Webster’s article A New 
Politics where he theorizes on a feedback loop of the decay of classic social relations in Western 
working-class life. He claims that as the salience of the working class in political and social life 
wanes in the face of the decline of stereotypical working-class industry, this begets more 
weakening of blue-collar sociality and the further decay of the working class as a social unit, 
thus furthering their political impotence. While Webster never explicitly referenced how the 
death of local community socialization could lead to a greater alienation with national identity- 
the maintenance of any working-class movement at a nationwide level is contingent on the 
activity of local communities. Webster then makes the claim that, “in place of community can be 
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identified a postmodern relativism in which values and conduct are regarded as highly 
differentiated lifestyle choices, which are incommensurable” (Webster 4). Identity politics then 
acts as the replacement for the politics of the nation-state. Webster framed this as a reactionary 
move while ignoring how the death of a state-based political consciousness may be a liberation 
for those who can now pursue their best interests outside of the nationally mandated Overton 
window. A political arena where the stakes are more based on personal performative individual 
decisions over inflexible national values is the perfect ideological battleground for a 
communication form as flexible as the meme.   
 A quick aside is needed to push back that a political paradigm that distances itself from 
the classic national politics is somehow a regression or any less legitimate. Although many 
pundits deride identity politics as a selfish aberration into tribalism- that naively assumes that the 
political process focused on the nation-state had everyone’s needs in mind. As identity politics 
includes people who were on the political margins, those who were firmly in the center of the 
more traditional process accuse this of a dilution of “legitimate” politics. This ignores that 
getting more people involved in the political process should, even from a purely numbers 
standpoint, make the political arena more legitimate as a public force. 
 This removal of the nation as a vector that carries political power also changes the 
dynamic in which the populace interacts with media corporations. If politics stays within the 
boundaries of the nation-state, then viewing the media as the third entity in the triumvirate of 
state, citizen, and media is a logical conclusion. As all the nations of the world economically and 
politically globalize- it became more complex to determine who the large media corporations 
serve and where the loyalties of the people lie. As media becomes instantaneous and identity-
driven an internationalist political arena unfolds on social media. Online there may be more in 
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common between you and someone on the other side of the world who opts into various political 
identities and decisions as opposed to your next-door neighbor whose political views are 
“unseemly.” Via this removal of the physical impetus of politics, the discussion of political 
thought and opinion loses the requirement of institutionally mandated veneer. In fact, the sleek 
professionalism of classically respected media institutions is often the first victim of who is 
written off as fake news.18 Most writers and pundits consider this to be a paradise lost of public 
debate. That people have been duped into living in a filter bubble,19 20 21 where people on their 
social media feeds receive endless positive affirmation of one’s own political opinion and never 
have to even consider the possibility that other people might disagree with them. This of course 
ignores the constant and nasty political “disagreements” that occur every second, on every social 
media platform. It also shows the discomfort that the traditional media corporations share where 
the media landscape is headed, where large top-down “media creators” have a shaky future. The 
significance of the shift to meta-journalism showcases that often individuals trust corporate news 
only once it has been “digested” by fellow non-institutional sources. The filter bubble canard 
also ignores how usual politics is based upon organizing around like-minded individuals in the 
party system.  
 Memes and their online popularity are the communication form par excellence for the 
new online political paradigm. Its lack of connection from any national media institution and rich 
visual elements allow it to exist internationally and encourage the online virality that is necessary 
for any online media form to succeed. This also should not be viewed that due to the comparative 
                                                          
18 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-media-news-survey/trust-the-news-most-people-dont-social-media-even-
more-suspect-study-idUSKBN19D015 
19 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/01/14/facebook-invites-you-to-live-in-a-bubble-
where-you-are-always-right/?utm_term=.241cf67a69a9 
20 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/arts/the-battle-over-your-political-bubble.html 
21 https://www.ted.com/talks/eli_pariser_beware_online_filter_bubbles 
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simplicity of memes that their success should be written off as proof of the dumbing down of the 
modern international political discourse. As seen in the previous section on the semiotic 
intricacies of memes; that a complete interpretation of them online requires a good deal of 
decoding ability.  
 Of course, the usage of the internet is not just a liberation from the giant restrictive 
corporations, but it also winnows public behavior through non-institutional channels. Marcel 
Danesi describes it as such,  
When the internet came into wide use, it was heralded as bringing 
about a liberation from conformity and a channel for expressing 
one’s opinions freely. But this view has proven to be specious. In 
contrast to the pre- internet print world, it can be said that internet 
culture is built on the attainment of a communal consciousness 
through artificial means. Living in a social media universe, we may 
indeed feel that it is the only option available to us. The triumph of 
social media universe, we may indeed feel that it is the only option 
available to us. The triumph of social media lies in their promise to 
allow human needs to be expressed individualistically, yet connect 
them to a common ground – hence the paradox. Moreover, as the 
communal brain takes shape in the global village, a form of global 
connected intelligence is merging, called by some a “global brain” 
(Danesi 174).  
 
 This movement to a decentralized media landscape changes the gatekeepers from a 
formalized institutional censorship to the specific mores of any one given group. On Reddit this 
concept is derided as a “circle-jerk”22 in which certain topics are either immediately favored or 
despised by “the hivemind,” and a topic’s circlejerk takes for granted its positive or negative 
traits.  
The meme’s mutability allows it to be placed in various social and cultural contexts and 
succeed as a legible online communication form. As stated in the semiotic section; memes 
                                                          
22 https://www.reddit.com/r/TheoryOfReddit/wiki/glossary 
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deliver comedy or any other intended content where all the information is contained within the 
conceptual framework of the meme, a meme that requires an undue amount of outside 
information is either intended for a very strict audience or is being purposefully obtuse. The 
meme can either be readable as an image or, if one has prior knowledge of the framework, as a 
member of a meme which carries with it all the additional characteristics.  
Memes and the behavior they encourage embody the anti-authoritarian attitude afforded 
by the internet that treats the political battlefields as one big playground. In Phillips’ This is Why 
We Can’t Have Nice Things, she correctly identifies earnest opinion as the antithesis of online 
trollish discourse. Phillips notes how it is functionally impossible to actually determine where the 
true beliefs of the trolls lie, as even in more formal 1-on-1 interview settings they could be 
“trolling the earnest academic.” A great mystery that remains even after the dust settles of the 
2016 presidential election is to what degree the meme-sharing keyboard warriors seriously 
agreed with Donald Trump’s politics or just viewed the victory for such a thought-to-be 
unwinnable candidate to be a troll of grand proportions. As Trump’s status changed from 
political commentator and iconoclast to major-party candidate, there was a definitive shift as 
Trump’s online fans pivoted from just slinging anti-Hillary memes and instead shared polling 
locations or advertised for phone banks. Nagle correctly characterized how Trump’s initial 
counter-cultural posture withered away as soon as he entered office. Even beyond Trump, Nagle 
questions whether the “alt-right” should continue to label itself as an alternative when one of 
their ilk is literally in the White House. Before his inauguration, Trump purposefully labeled 
himself as a political outsider. The memes of the Trump campaign (and the relative move away 
from them once he seemed to be a legitimate candidate) served as a socially sanctioning force. 
The popularity of pro-Trump memes that were assumedly made by his voters independent of any 
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formal political structure gave credence to the claim that people approved of him politically. 
Where Hillary and Jeb had paid staffers constructing purposefully fabricated images for 
dissemination on politically sanctioned channels, Trump’s unmoored fanbase made images that 
had the politically valuable property of coming from a grassroots angle. While it is likely that 
Trump encouraged this behavior (by sharing the Pepe meme on Twitter for example) it is 
unlikely that any political candidate could churn out the level of Pro-Trump online content 
without some amount of people doing it under their own volition. The same dynamic of giving 
legitimacy to the campaigns of political outsiders through online communication happened with 
Bernie Sanders. Hundreds of thousands of users posted and re-shared grassroots created content 
on the Facebook page Bernie Sanders Dank Meme Stash. While for Sanders this did not give 
him a path to the presidency, it however helped elevate his status in the political consciousness 
of the country to the degree that he is now the most popular politician in the nation.23  
 
iii. The Grassroots Factor of Memetic Communication 
The process of meme-creation is difficult, as its legibility is contingent on a correct 
application of both added content and the framework. This gives anyone who wishes to make a 
meme a high hurdle to conquer because it needs to display its framework correctly and it is 
obvious when the meme fails. By requiring the signifiers of the meme’s template to be at the 
front and center of any individual instantiations, communicating with memes mandates a rich 
knowledge of their history and usage. Many corporate-made memes have failed in the past. 
Arguably the most heinous being a Wendy’s television ad, offering up a new sandwich that has 
garnered a reaction from the “The Memer.” The advertisement, which shows a male subject 
                                                          
23 https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/xww4ek/bernie-sanders-is-the-most-popular-politician-in-america-poll-
says-vgtrn 
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opting into various aesthetic and linguistic signifiers of a meme-culture that was, even at the time 
of the advertisement’s airing, horribly out of date. Wendy’s corporate advertising team failed 
where Trump and Bernie’s unprofessional keyboard warriors succeeded.  
A definitive conclusion on the future political power of the meme is impossible. There 
are two possibilities when considering the future of meme application. One being that the meme 
will continue to be a counter-cultural signifier and the adequate amount of template knowledge 
to construct legible memes will sufficiently deter any corporate or institutional appropriation. 
The evidence to suggest this is the slipperiness of online culture, as accounted for by Phillips, 
that online culture as we know it needs an amount of irony and trolling. However, is is also 
possible that astro-turfed memes will be the most popular political tool to be used in upcoming 
high-profile elections. Within the paradigm of the politics of authenticity- campaigns have 
always known of the efficacy of a healthy grassroots element of the political process. By being 
able to now construct a different strain of media image- the political independence or 
authenticity of the candidate can be advertised at the same level of all other policy issues.  
 
iv. The Future of the Memes 
If all of history arrives first as tragedy and then as farce- the electoral victories of Trump 
are ripe for a farcical reflection. The meme may harden as an institutionally recognized form of 
communication as politicians use it to jockey for the sincerest performance of authenticity. The 
question remains as to whether people’s newfound desire for a legitimate grassroots 
communication channel will be shunted onto another bundle of signifiers after the death of the 
meme. Despite the communication form’s structural resistance to outside commodification, its 
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ability as a tool to broadcast populist support is too attractive for interests both corporate and 
political alike.  
Authenticity has always been desirable, both in oneself and others. The knowledge that 
your behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs are coming from a place of true respect and conviction is 
important for maintaining a good self-image. Online, it is common that users discredit those who 
engage in ideological scuffles with them as “paid shills.24” The paranoia of calling people who 
disagree with you a shill is an attempt to undermine potential political antagonism. It is akin to 
being an online ideological mercenary fighting the battle not because you believe in it, but 
because you were paid. This same strand of thinking extends to conspiracy theorists who portend 
that survivors of mass shootings are “crisis actors” being paid to act a certain way to support a 
relevant political agenda. Memes and those who share them in good faith can serve as a form of 
inoculation from people whose sole ideological defense is assuming that people who disagree 
with them are only paid to do so. In addition to the fear of the shill, many online users think that 
all “real people” are on their side of the political dispute. As meme-use can be obscure and 
nonsensical for those ill-informed of online aesthetics and behavior, it provided a sense of 
authenticity that is now unfortunately receding. Where previously it was unthinkable to imagine 
a politician tweeting a Pepe, that barrier has been broken. There is no reason why other signifiers 
of online internet usage will not suffer a similar fate. Where once the internet was a radically 
other form of sociality, with different linguistic and aesthetic signifiers born not from any 
corporate or technocratic oligarchs, it is now unfortunately consumed with paranoia. While 
before making jokes about how the government and the media was ruling one’s life was a 
                                                          
24 https://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-fiorella/cyber-shills_b_2803801.html 
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cliched given, there was always the belief that you could “get away from it all.” This new form 
of paranoia is an expression that the online is losing its status as protected from manipulation.  
However, one should not discredit the internet’s ability to be transgressive. As 
mediocritizing and corporatizing forces approach online culture, it is possible to continue 
editing-it and altering-it. If the sole corporate attempts were as ineffectual as the Wendy’s meme 
ads the internet has nothing to fear. In addition, transgression for transgressions sake is only 
worth-saving as long as it is challenging hegemonic power structures. While the internet has the 
ability to both “punch-up” and “punch-down” it is often the most racist, misogynistic, and all-
around bigoted portions of the internet that all forms of institutional power tend to give a wide-
berth. Memes, and an internet in general, that allow citizen-based political discussion that does 
not have any moneyed interest at stake, is something worth fighting to defend.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
i. Theoretical Implications 
In closing, connecting the communicative contexts of memes and the political theories of 
the thinkers Hannah Arendt and Chantal Mouffe is apropos. While the bulk of their thought is 
separated by half a century, both saw a similar atrophy of the political process which they 
viewed as a loss of a pivotal part of what it meant to be human. To Arendt the ultimate sine qua 
non for all humans is the political action. The prerequisites for action are varied and complex; 
nevertheless, Arendt distances action from the other two modes of being: labor and work. Where 
labor is rote reproduction of life itself and work is constructing something outside of the realm of 
biological reproduction, action transcends beyond both paradigms. Action, for Arendt, requires 
human’s innate ability to forgive. In her magnum opus, The Human Condition she states that, 
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“Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to 
act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed from which we could never recover; we 
would remain the victims of its consequences forever” (Arendt 257). Only by being freed from 
the past and not having political expression be obscured by the pall of reaction, can a legitimate 
body politic be constructed. The fears of astroturfing, paid shills, or Russian trolls are an inability 
to forgive. Dredging up past ideological clashes at every turn for Arendt prevents politics from 
occurring, this happens online to such a degree that some refuse to believe that they are actually 
talking to other people.25 Although Arendt fears that the only political action becomes reaction 
without forgiveness, instead the body politic-to-be has been rendered inert by atomization and 
suspicion.  
 
ii. Synthesizing Arendt and Mouffe 
Bridging the gap between the Arendtian act of forgiveness and memetic communication 
is the more modern critique that Mouffe wages against “deliberative democracy.” Mouffe’s 
criticism hinges on what she believes to be a mere performance of political antagonism in the 
face of an unrelenting moralized status quo. Mouffe adequately describes modern politics as 
smuggling in a great deal of ideological assumptions with the guise of non-ideological 
rationality. For Mouffe, the political always happens at the level of antagonism. Although many 
modern online political discussion boards are certainly antagonistic, they lack the paradigm that 
Mouffe seeks: one of right vs left, as opposed to right vs wrong. Institutionally sanctioned 
political communications are guiltier of this sin. In mainstream media outlets free speech is 
claimed to be sacrosanct while there is a pile of political sensibilities and all forms of “the other” 
                                                          
25 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/23/russian-bots-us-election-coup-d-etat 
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are silenced on the political margins. Mouffe disagrees with Arendt and directly references her in 
her book: On the Political. Mouffe states, “some theorists such as Hannah Arendt envisage the 
political as a space of freedom and public deliberation while others see it as a space of power, 
conflict, and antagonism. My understanding of the political falls with the latter” (Mouffe 8).  
This dismissal of Arendt as a champion of democratic deliberation avoids the possibilities for 
synthesis of their respective philosophies. While Mouffe correctly lauds antagonism, she does 
not adequately consider how the Arendtian action is in fact one of the necessary conditions for 
political antagonism. I posit that forgiveness does not impede the ability for political antagonism, 
but rather is the only way for it to occur. For Mouffe, antagonism means an encounter with a 
political Other, and she goes to great pains to claim we should resist the temptation to define the 
political Other within the framework of one’s own moral system. The clash of ideologies can 
only be fruitful if there is no misrepresentation or misconception of what is at stake or what both 
parties are arguing over. It is here that the antagonism of right vs left that Mouffe desires comes 
into concert with Arendtian action. This synthesis claims that the eschewing of the past affords 
for a politics of what is at hand, as opposed to the façade of politics that needs to quarrel over all 
sorts of predetermined political opinions to the extent that it becomes sport.  
 
iii. Political Action in a Trump Democracy 
Connecting democratic political theory with the banality of the internet meme is a gesture 
to the sorry state of current political discourse. Not in the sense that memes are boorish and 
facile, although they often are, but rather that this is one of the only havens of actual politics in 
the current society. The unexpected political power of memes tells us as much about the failure 
of traditional forms of democratic governance as about memes themselves. As institutionalized 
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media forms fail to question so many of the “taken-for-granted” qualities of the main hegemonic 
discourse in the name of rational liberalism, there remains a desperate need to look beyond it. 
The main selling point of Donald Trump’s political campaign was his performance of outside 
appeal, his low-brow iconoclasm and repeated cries to “drain the swamp” reflected the anxieties 
present around the smothering permanence of the sacred power structures. Trump’s presidency 
has unfortunately caused a strengthening of the right vs. wrong mentality where all members of 
the media class laud politicians such as Bill Kristol,26 David Frum,27 and George W. Bush28 who 
all make complaints about small technocratic policy issues and Trump’s histrionics. These men 
of course all share large amounts of political ideology with Trump but were nevertheless 
welcomed into the fold of the #resistance which remained impressively blind to actual political 
opinions.  
 The Trump presidency which has been characterized as a decline of American 
democracy, which is a very reasonably response when seeing either his comportment or fascist 
tendencies, slightly misses the point. There is in fact a bittersweet interpretation of Trump’s 
victory, one in which it can serve as proof of the desire of the American public for a genuine 
political alternative outside of the current liberal hegemony. Where in Trump’s case it was a 
mere performance of being a political outsider (as being a political outsider is functionally 
impossible as a billionaire) he is a living example that authenticity is the most valuable political 
stance that a politician can foster. In the general election, one of the main selling points of the 
presidential candidates was advertising the fact that they were simply not their opponents and 
that alone functioned as the ultimate qualification of their electability. Trump eschewed civility 
                                                          
26 https://www.weeklystandard.com/kristol-trump-is-discrediting-conservatism/article/2003815 
27 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/books/review/david-frum-trumpocracy.html 
28 https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/03/george-w-bush-liberals-freedom-press-media-russia-investigation-
donald-trump/ 
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to broadcast his populism and Clinton made every effort to appear as reasonable as possible. 
Trump broadcasted her obsession with decorum and liberal values as evidence of being firmly 
ensconced within the hegemonic identity. It is likely that the status of being perceived as an 
outsider vs insider was the main political difference between the two.  
 
iv. Memes as Emancipatory 
In conclusion, a definitive statement on the future of the intersection between media and 
politics is too complex to pin down. Although the semiotic structures of memes functions by 
maintaining in-group/out-group dynamics, the allure of appearing genuinely authentic is a very 
powerful motivator for interests both political and corporate.  
In many ways the two possible futures of the meme are reflected upon the interpretations 
of the Trump presidency. Where liberalism views Trump’s demagoguery and his lack of reliance 
on mainstream acceptability as evidence for his political monstrousness and prop up classic 
media institutions as the only thing that can help us survive the unique evil of Trump’s vulgarity. 
It is perverse that many pundits now view the act of subscription to a paper such as the 
Washington Post or the New York Times as an act of political resistance without considering 
what conditions led to his election in the first place.  
 Opposed to the liberal interpretation of Trump and memes lies the potential for an 
emancipatory future. The meme’s ability to communicate in a way divorced from the hegemony 
encourages communication between individuals. Memes, and their resistance to appropriation 
from institutional powers may afford a relatively fearless communication, one characterized with 
a confidence that the person on the other side is an individual. The antagonism that Mouffe 
wants and the action of Arendt’s dreams needs an avenue free of corporatized or institutionalized 
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interests. It is only through legitimate political discussion can legitimate political action occur. 
Therefore, communication forms like the meme are necessary for any emancipatory or 
revolutionary politics. I will end with just one more meme, found on a Donald Trump forum, but 
I feel no reason why they should get to keep it.  
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